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More than a century has passed since the British diplomat Sir Charles Eliot wrote one 
of the most creative and certainly one of the most accurate descriptions of the Vlach 
people:
They remind one of those ingenious pictures in which an animal or a human face is concealed so as 
not to be obvious on first inspection, though when once seen it appears to be the principal feature of 
the drawing. In the same way, one may live and travel in the Balkan lands without seeing or hearing 
anything of the Vlachs, until one’s eyes are opened. Then one runs the risk of going to the opposite 
extreme, and thinking… that most of the inhabitants of Macedonia are Vlachs in disguise.1
1 Odysseus, Turkey in Europe, London 1900, pp. 409–410. 
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Fast forward into the 21st century Balkans and Sir Eliot’s beautiful depiction does 
not lose a bit of its accuracy. Nowadays even a well-trained eye will struggle to rec-
ognize the numerous Vlachs among the bulk of the romanian population in south-
ern romania, or among the peoples inhabiting central and northern Greece, while the 
historically-rooted development of camouflaging skills makes it an impossible task 
for the outsider to differentiate the Vlach from his ethnic Macedonian, Albanian or 
Serbian compatriot. Being a stateless ethnic minority that behaves like a majority,2 
the Vlachs remain the concealed human face in the picture. But when “one’s eyes are 
opened”, the hidden face will appear in each and every part of social life in southeast 
Europe. The perceptive observer will find the Vlachs in music, in art, in sports, and in 
industry. They will be found in folklore and in science, in tradition and modernity, in 
history schoolbooks and in contemporary politics, in religion, and even in a national 
anthem.3 With eyes wide open, one can indeed see them in every field of social life in 
every Balkan state, but nowhere was the role of the Vlachs as big as it was in the cul-
ture and politics of one particular state – Greece.4
Most travelogue writers who visited the Balkans in the 19th and 20th centuries not-
ed that a significant component of those who declared themselves Greek were actual-
ly of Vlach origin. Indeed, before the various propaganda and nationalist movements 
exploded onto the Balkan scene, the Vlachs lived in spiritual unity with the Greeks. 
The paucity and the dispersal of the Vlachs facilitated the process of Hellenization, so 
a significant chunk of the Vlach population spoke Greek and attended religious cere-
monies in Greek to the point that many Vlachs were inspired by Greek culture more 
than the Greeks themselves. The rationale behind this solidarity with the Greeks is 
much more complex to be attributed solely to the geographical proximity of the Greek 
lands and the wealth of the Greek culture. The rich cultural heritage of the Byzantine 
civilization, the more privileged position of the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire, the 
common struggle against the Ottoman army during the Greek War of Independence, 
the absence of Vlach educational institutions, as well as the strong religious influence 
of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople played a vital role in this process 
2 see: t. Kahl, The Ethnicity of the Aromanians after 1990: the identity of a minority that Behaves 
like a majority, „Ethnologia Balkanica, Journal for Southeast European Anthropology” 2002, vol. 6, 
p. 145–169.
3 Pitu Guli, a Vlach revolutionary from Ottoman Macedonia, is mentioned in the national anthem of 
the republic of Macedonia. 
4 The role of the Vlachs in the history of Greece, represented in their numerous patrons, nation-
al heroes, politicians, intellectuals and clergy is of great importance for their identity as a part of the 
modern Greek people. Especially their numbers among Greek benefactors is often ephasiesed by politi-
cians and historians. Vlachs are to be found among the independence fighters rhigas Feraios, Georgakis 
Olympios, Theodoros and Alexis Grivas; they were some of the best known maecenas, Baron Georgios 
Sinas, Simon Sinas, Nikolaos Stournaris, Georgios Stavrou, Georgios Averof, Konstantinos Zappas; and 
were also among the important politicians, like Ioannis Kolettis, Spyridon Lambros, Evangelos Averof 
tositsas etc. (see: thede Kahl, Aromanians in Greece. Minority or Vlach-Speaking Greeks, Minorities in 
Greece-Historical Issues and New Perspectives, “Jahrbücher für Geschichte und Kultur Südostreuropas” 
2003, vol. 5, p. 212–213). 
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of Hellenization of the Vlachs. However, various practical reasons contributed to this 
Hellenization and were just as effective as the above-mentioned factors. Large groups 
of Vlachs earned their living as settled or itinerant traders, merchants, craftsmen and 
industrialists. Their everyday jobs pushed them towards the eastern Mediterranean 
ports where the Greek language was the Lingua Franca of the region. In fact, with-
out being fluent in Greek, trading with Greece, Egypt or anywhere in the eastern 
Mediterranean was practically impossible. Thus, the Vlach urban class and the rich 
and prominent Vlachs made a significant contribution to the creation of this dual iden-
tity of the Vlachs, or, in some cases, their complete assimilation.5
For centuries, the Vlachs have lived with and integrated with their Greek neigh-
bors, and they have emerged by their own efforts as a valuable component of modern 
Greek history and modern Greek identity. Being vigorous supporters of the Hellenic 
idea, the majority of these Vlachs living within the Greek borders developed a sense 
of belonging to the Greek, or at least to the modern Greek nation.6 Furthermore, some 
Vlachs managed to climb up to the top of the political hierarchy in Greece and shaped 
Greek politics. In his study on the Vlachs, Nikolaos Mertzos, a Vlach himself, writes 
about the importance of the Vlachs in every field of Greek society, as well as their im-
portance for the history of modern Greece.7 According to Mertzos, a certain number 
of prominent Greek politicians had Vlach origins, and among them he highlights the 
Prime Ministers Ioannis Kolettis, Spyridon Lambros and Field Marshall Alexandros 
Papagos, but also the first female minister in Greece, Lina Tsaldari.8
Ioannis Kolettis, the first Vlach to become Prime Minister of Greece, was born 
circa 1784 in Syrrako,9 a village in Epirus with a predominantly Vlach population. He 
finished elementary school in Syrrako and Kalarites, and gymnasium in Ioannina, be-
fore leaving for Pisa in Italy to study medicine.
On his return from Pisa he settled in Ioannina, where he worked as a doctor on 
Ali Pasha of Tepelena’s court. There he became close friends with Ali’s son Muqtar 
Pasha. His stay in Ioannina helped to shape his political views. It was there that he en-
tered Filiki Eteria, a secret organization founded in 1814 in Odessa, whose purpose 
5 Н. Минов, Влашкото прашање и романската пропаганда во Македонија (1860–1903), Скопје 
2013, p. 119–120. Indeed, the explanation for the Hellenization of the Vlachs fits more or less the case 
with the Southern Slavs in Bulgaria and Ottoman Macedonia, who were not Hellenized. But unlike the 
Vlachs, whose urban elite paved the way for Hellenization, the Southern Slavs were in vast majority a ru-
ral, agricultural and iliterate population. Moreover, once these Slavs started attending schools in numbers 
in the last decades of the 19th century, those schools were Bulgarian, and they operated under the jurisdic-
tion of the Bulgarian Exarchate. 
6 A. I. Koukoudis, The Vlachs, Metropolis and Diaspora, Thessaloniki 2003, p. 31–33. Koukoudis 
mentions the words of certain Kostas Ziogas, a Vlach from Perithori, who told him: Look, lad, the Greki 
(Christians whose mother tongue is one of the Greek dialects) aren’t more Greek than we are. We may be 
Vlachs, they may be Greki, but all together we make up the Greeks.
7 Н. И. Мердзос, Аромани-Власи, Тесалоники 2010. 
8 Ibidem, p. 38. 
9 Γ. Γ. Μπενέκου, Κωλέτης – o πατέρας των πολιτικών μας ηθών, Αθήνα 1961, p. 25. 
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was to overthrow the Ottoman rule in all the territories inhabited by Greeks, and to es-
tablish an independent Greek state.10
On 17 March 1821, the inhabitants of the Mani Peninsula in the southern 
Peloponnese declared war on the Ottomans. Eight days later, the Greek revolution 
was officially declared and by the end of the month the Peloponnese was in open re-
volt against the Turks. Ioannis Kolettis wasted no time in joining the revolution, and 
took part in the battles against the Ottoman forces. In the course of the revolution he 
became the leader of the coalition of rumeliot captains, and during the civil war be-
tween the rebel factions he became one of the most influential figures in Greek revo-
lutionary circles.
During the Greek revolution, I. Kolettis showed that he knew how to make his 
long tenure in the national executive body serve personal ends.11 Petropoulos wrote 
that I. Kolettis, although a civilian himself, had become an advocate for the chieftain’s 
interests, which were the key of the political power.12 He never forgot their usefulness 
in accomplishing his political ambition.
Finlay wrote that with patience and silence, he profited from the blunders of his 
colleagues, always, himself, doing and saying as little as possible.13 His way of politi-
cal activity was crowned with success. I. Kolettis became a more influential politician 
during the war for Greek independence than Ypsilantis, Mavrocordatos, Kondouriotis 
and Zaimis.14 
During the early days of the Greek state, I. Kolettis collaborated with the un-
derage king of Greece and the Bavarian regency. He was one of the signatories of 
the Constitution of the Church of Greece,15 which was not yet recognized by the 
Patriarchate of Constantinople. The decision to declare the Church of Greece as au-
tocephalous roiled Greek politics for decades and split the deeply conservative Greek 
society in two.
In April 1833, soon after the Bavarian Prince Otto was elected king of Greece, 
I. Kolettis became Minister of the Navy and Minister of Defense. Later he became 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers,16 though not a Prime Minister, because, as his 
biographer Giannis Benekos notes, the title Prime Minister did not exist in Greece.17 
When he was Chairman of the Council of Ministers, I. Kolettis had to deal with an up-
rising in Arcadia.
10 J. Blancard, Coletti, Montpellier 1885, p. 9. 
11 J. A. Petropoulos, Politics and statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece 1833–1843, Princeton 1968, 
p. 93. 
12 Ibidem, p. 93–94. 
13 G. Finlay, The history of Greek revolution 2, Edinburgh and London 1861, p. 32. 
14 Ibidem. 
15 For the text of the declaration see: F. Strong, Greece as a kingdom or a statistical description of 
that country from that arrival of king Otho in 1833 down to the present time, London 1842, p. 352–356. 
16 „Εφημερίς της Κυβερνήσεως του Βασιλείου της Ελλάδος” 1834, no 20, p. 159. 
17 Γ. Γ. Μπενέκου, Κωλέτης…, p. 201. 
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However, his character and ambition for political power and influence did not 
comply with the ideas of the Bavarian rulers of Greece. In 1835 king Otto reached 
adulthood. He wanted to strengthen his personal powers, for which he relied on the 
advices of Josef Ludwig von Armansperg, a member of the former regency Council, 
who replaced I. Kolettis as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. This Bavarian coun-
selor could not stand I. Kolettis’s presence near Otto, so he endeavored to distance his 
rival from the king. However, this required consent from king Otto to remove Kolettis 
from Greece. In 1835 he was sent to Paris as a diplomatic representative of his coun-
try. Despite his removal from the Greek political scene, I. Kolettis did not terminate 
contacts with his friends and supporters. He maintained a stable correspondence with 
his friends in Greece, managing to retain some control over his political group.18 
Throughout his diplomatic mission in Paris, I. Kolettis established very close and 
friendly relations with the French diplomat and minister for foreign affairs of France, 
Guizot. According to the French diplomat, Kolettis lived very modestly in Paris, sup-
porting the interest of his country.19 Guizot considered him a man of trust. 
While he was on a diplomatic mission in France, the political situation in Greece 
deteriorated. Its climax culminated with the so-called revolution of 3 September, al-
though it was classic coup d’etat, when the military units left their barracks with the 
demand for Greece to become a constitutional monarchy. The coup d’etat launched 
on 3 September 1843 came as a consequence of the great dissatisfaction prevailing 
amongst the Greeks from the Bavarian ruling with Greece. Bavarians dominated in 
the political life in Greece. The monarch and his advisers ruled in an autocratic man-
ner. The German language was used in administration alongside with the Greek. The 
Greek officials were only the head of the departments within the Council of secretar-
ies.20 The Church was forced to cut itself off from the Constantinople Patriarchate. 
According to Stavrianos, the most serious error of the Bavarians and king Otto, him-
self, was in treating the Greeks as though they were unfit to participate in their own 
government.21 In such a state of affairs, the revolt of the Greeks was unavoidable. 
In October 1843, I. Kolettis returned to Athens. He was hailed by several thou-
sands of his supporters. After his arrival in the Greek capital, he met with the French 
diplomatic representative in Athens, Piscatory, who advised him to be cautious in his 
contacts with the British ambassador in Athens, Edmund Lyons.22 This advice was not 
illogical bearing in mind the interest of France in Greece. I. Kolettis, as the leader of 
the so-called French party in Greece, was a trusted man in Paris.
Soon after his return to Greece, Kolettis held a meeting with the leaders of the 
English party and the russian party, Mavrokordatos and Metaxas. During the meet-
18 J. A. Petropoulos, Politics and statecraft in Kingdom of Greece 1833–1843, p. 415. 
19 M. Guizot, France under Louis – Philippe. From 1841 to 1847, London 1865, p. 246. 
20 L. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, London 2000 p. 293. 
21 Ibidem. 
22 M. Guizot, France under Louis-Philippe…, p. 273. 
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ing there was no disagreement among the political leaders in Greece.23 I. Kolettis and 
Mavrokordatos, despite their mutual mistrust which originated from the time of the 
Greek independence war, started to collaborate.24 The influence of the British and the 
French ambassadors in Athens in their cooperation had been apparent. 
On 20 November 1843, for the first time in modern Greek history, the new Parlia-
ment started the debates about the first Greek constitution. At the parliamentary ses-
sion on 26 November 1843, its members elected a commission of 21 members to write 
a Constitution.25 The preparations for the constitution were effectively in the hands of 
the leaders of the three parties: Mavrokordatos of the “English” party, I. Kolettis of the 
“French” party, and Metaxas of the “russian” party.26 At the end of December 1843, 
the appointed committee presented a draft text of the constitution to the Parliament.27 
The work of the Parliament to discuss the draft constitution started on 3 January 
1844. Woodhouse noted that the leaders of the three political groups in Greece were 
born outside the geographical limits of the kingdom.28 It was to be expected that they 
should sympathize with the demands of the non-native Greeks during the discussions 
in the Greek Parliament. 
In January 1844, during the debates on the draft text of the Constitution, a seri-
ous discussion was raised in the Parliament about the rights of the native and non–na-
tive Greeks. The conflict between them was essentially a power struggle. The non–na-
tives (heterochtones) held the highest ranks in public administration, while the native 
Greeks (autochtones) struggled to secure a place in civil service.29 there was consid-
erable public feeling that those Greeks who had arrived in the kingdom from the other 
parts of the Balkans after the war for Independence war should be banned from hold-
ing public office and should even be excluded from the right to have Greek citizen-
ship.30 Young students who had graduated from Athens University strongly opposed 
the rights of the so-called non–native Greeks to occupy public office.31 The non–na-
tives insisted that the War for independence concerned the entire Greek race in the 
Kingdom of Greece and in the Ottoman Empire, thus they deserved political rights in 
the independent Greek state. The arguments of the native Greeks were quite the oppo-
site. They insisted on the limitation of the geographical area of the war, meaning the 
23 Ibidem, p. 274. 
24 D. McLean, The Greek revolution and the Anglo-French entente 1843–4, „The English Historical 
review” 1981, vol. 96, no 378, p. 120. 
25 T. E. Ευαγγελίδoυ, Ιστορία του Όθωνος βασιλέως της Ελλάδος 1832–1862, Αθήνα 1894, p. 230. 
26 C. M. Woodhouse, Diplomatic development. Nineteenth and twentieth century, in: Greece in tran-
sition, ed. J. T. A. Koumoulides, London 1977, p. 99. 
27 T. E. Ευαγγελίδoυ, Ιστορία του Όθωνος…, p. 230–231. 
28 C. M. Woodhouse, Diplomatic development…, p. 99. 
29 I. michailidis, The formation of Greek citizenship (19th century), in: Citizenship in historical per-
spective, eds. S. G. Ellis, G. Hálfdanarson, A. K. Isaacs, Pisa 2006, p. 157. 
30 P. Mackridge, Language and national identity in Greece 1776–1976, Oxford 2009, p. 175. 
31 Ioannis Kolettis: Of this Great idea, in: Discourses of collective identity in Central and Southeast 
Europe (1770–1945). National romanticism. The formation of national movements, eds. B. Trencsenyi, 
M. Kopeček, Budapest 2007, vol. 2, p. 246. 
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specific region in the southernmost part of the Balkan Peninsula in which only those 
who lived within its borders had any political rights. 32 
I. Kolettis was heterochton (non–native) himself and vigorously supported the 
cause of those who were not born within the borders of the Kingdom of Greece. He 
firmly believed that Greeks were not only the inhabitants of the Kingdom of Greece, 
but also those who lived outside the borders of the tiny independent Greece.33 On 14 
January 1844, he delivered his speech in the Greek Parliament. In his speech, among 
other things, Kolettis said: 
Greece is the center of Europe; positioned thus, and having to its right the East, and to its left the 
West, it has been destined, on the one hand, by falling, to enlightened the West, and, on the other, by 
being reborn, to enlightened the East. The former was accomplished by our forefathers, while the lat-
ter has been assigned to us; it is in the spirit of this oath and of this ‘Great Idea’ that I have always 
seen the plenipotentiaries of the nation assemble in order to decide no longer the fate of Greece, but 
of the Hellenic race… The Kingdom of Greece is not Greece. It constitutes only one part, the smallest 
and feeblest. The name Hellenes describes not only those who live in this kingdom, but also those who 
live in Ioannina, in Thessaloniki, in Serres, in Adrianople, in Constantinople, in Trebizond, in Crete, 
in Samos and in any territory associated with the Hellenic history and the Hellenic race…There are 
two cores of Hellenism: Athens, the capital of the Hellenic kingdom and The City (Constantinople), 
the vision and hope of all Hellenes….34
I. Kolettis’s speech in the Greek Parliament was not an accidental promotion of 
the Great Idea and the desire for territorial expansion of Greece at the expense of 
the Ottoman Empire. I. Kolettis, as many influential Greek politicians and intellectu-
als at that time, was not satisfied with the border line of the Kingdom of Greece that 
had been drawn out by the Great Powers. In his conversation as Greek ambassador 
in Paris with Guizot, Kolettis said: From the frontier of my liberated country I see in 
my country, still enslaved the place where I left the tomb of my father.35 A few years 
earlier, when he was called upon by the Council for his opinion in regards to choos-
ing the capital of the Kingdom of Greece, he answered – Constantinople.36 It is inter-
esting to note here that in 1834 I. Kolettis argued against making Athens the capital 
of the Kingdom of Greece, considering Constantinople to be the center of the Greek 
world.37
regardless of his nationalistic speech in the Greek Parliament, the Constitution 
largely justified the positions of the native-born Greeks. Michailidis writes that with 
the decisions of the Parliament several dozen non–native Greeks were dismissed from 
32 I. michailidis, The formation of Greek citizenship…, p. 157. 
33 r. Clogg, A concise history of Greece, Cambridge 2002, p. 47. 
34 Ibidem, p. 247–248. 
35 M. Guizot, France under Louis-Philipp…, p. 244. 
36 J. H. Skene, The spirit of change in Southern Europe, „Colburn’s new monthly magazine” 1849, 
no 345, p. 45. 
37 N. Doumanis, A History of Greece, Basingstoke 2010, p. 180. 
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their posts.38 However, an exception was made for I. Kolettis and a few other non–na-
tive Greeks.39
Once the text of the Constitution was prepared, it was given to the king of Greece 
on 18 February 1844. It was widely expected that Otto would sign the text and grant 
the Constitution, however the king was not satisfied by certain parts of it. At a meet-
ing attended by the monarch and all the political leaders of Greece, Kolettis impetu-
ously told the Greek sovereign that he had seen many kings without a throne, but nev-
er a throne without a king.40 Otto was infuriated by this comment, but he nevertheless 
signed the first constitution of the Greek kingdom, which now became a constitutional 
monarchy. These words by Kolettis addressed to the Greek monarch did not have any 
negative consequences in their future communication. Quite the contrary, the leader 
of the so-called French Party remained one of the greatest supporters of the monarch, 
which would soon become clear.
I. Kolettis was not pleased with the development of the political course in Greece 
even before the promulgation of the new Constitution. In his letter to Desages, the di-
rector of political affairs of the French ministry for foreign affairs, Kolettis stressed 
that he was concerned about the future of the new political system in Greece. He 
complained about Mavrocordatos’s inability to cope with Metaxas. In his letter to 
his French friend, I. Kolettis outlined his opinion about the formation of the govern-
ment: 
The ministry, therefore, must be strong to accomplish successfully the heavy task which will be im-
posed on it. As to myself I am far from dreading such a burden; but I desire to bear it nobly. I wish 
to have all possible chance to success. To succeed, I must be seconded by men who will be devoted 
to me. If the administration is not of my mind, success is impossible…I believe I am capable of sav-
ing it, but I must have the requisite means. I am therefore determined not to depart from the line of 
conduct.41 
In other words, he was not prepared to support any government which would not 
work as he thought it should. I. Kolettis did not exclude the possibility of supporting 
Mavrocordatos as Prime Minister, but it was indispensable to have his own ministers 
in such a government.42 As he said, I. Kolettis supported the formation of a govern-
ment with Mavrokordatos as Prime Minister. This support did not mean that Kolettis 
had given up, in the future, to become the head of the Greek government. It must be 
said that the pressure of the French ambassador in Athens, Piscatory, on I. Kolettis to 
support the formation of a government with Mavrokordatos as Prime Minister yield-
ed results.
38 I. michailidis, The formation of Greek citizenship…, p. 157. 
39 P. Mackridge, Language and national identity in Greece…, p. 176. 
40 Γ. Γ. Μπενέκου, Κωλέτης…, p. 252. 
41 M. Guizot, France under Louis-Philippe…, p. 286–287. 
42 Ibidem. 
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 Mavrocordatos’ government lasted only four months. I. Kolettis and Metaxas 
aligned themselves and thus caused his fall.43 Mavrocordatos had made a great mis-
take; he had permitted his political opponents to accuse him of centralizing all the 
power under his control, using illegal means to obtain the power.44 He was accused 
by his rivals of deception in the election in June 1844, which had taken place at the 
University in Athens. Mavrocordatos was elected by the professors at the University 
as a Member of Parliament, although he was not a professor himself. His election into 
a Member of the Parliament resulted in a vast wave of discontent and criticism in the 
country. I. Kolettis, as Finlay informs us, found no difficulty in persuading the pro-
fessors about the illegal nature of Mavrocordatos‘ election.45 Mavrocordatos’ election 
was declared void and a new election took place. The leader of the “English” party 
was not alone in creating problems and fraud during the lengthy elections in 1844. His 
minister of justice, Londos, issued a secret order to the gendarmes at Patras to utilize 
every means in their power to obtain a majority of votes in his favor.46 However, his 
order was made public by some of those with whom he had communicated. The gen-
eral indignation was so great that Londos had to resign. This was a great chance for 
I. Kolettis to topple Mavrokordatos’ government. 
The Greek king Otto immediately appointed I. Kolettis to form a new Government. 
I. Kolettis became Prime Minister on 6 August 1844. His support and sympathy for 
king Otto was no secret to the Greek politicians and public opinion. Immediately 
after Kolettis had been proclaimed Prime Minister with a royal decree, he issued 
a Proclamation to the Greeks, stating his desire to improve the situation in the coun-
try. In addition to this, there is a thread of gratitude to the king which can be detect-
ed in the Proclamation.47 
At the beginning of his rule in Greece, I. Kolettis enjoyed the support of Metaxas 
and his “russian” party. This support was very important to the leader of the “French” 
party because he did not have majority in the Greek parliament without the votes 
of the supporters of Metaxas. Metaxas was in charge of the Ministries of Navy and 
Economy, while Prime Minister I. Kolettis reserved the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, 
Internal Affairs, and Ecclesiastical Affairs for himself.48 I. Kolettis became a more 
dominant figure than Metaxas in the Greek government. Step by step, he succeed-
ed in diminishing the influence of the leader of the “russian” party. At the end of 
1844, the French ambassador in Athens, Piscatory, commented that the “russian” par-
43 D. McLean, The Greek revolution and the Anglo-French entente…, p. 121. 
44 G. Finlay, A History of Greece from its conquest by the Romans to the present time, Oxford 1877, 
vol. 7, p. 190. 
45 Ibidem, p. 189. 
46 Ibidem, p. 192. 
47 „Εφημερίς της Κυβερνήσεως του Βασιλείου της Ελλάδος” 1834, no 27, p. 36. 
48 J. V. Kofas, International and domestic politics in Greece during the Crimean War, Chicago 1979, 
p. 13. http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/1818 [Access: 09.07.2017]. In our article we use the PhD thesis 
of Kofas who published the book with the same title in 1980. 
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ty was disintegrating under the sun of Kolettis.49 Metaxas was not able to cope with 
the strengthening of I. Kolettis’s power. Therefore, on 26 July 1845, he resigned from 
his posts in the Greek government. At first glance, one might have expected that his 
resignation would provoke the fall of Kolettis‘s government, but the Prime Minister 
had great support from the King. Thus, in his letter to Metternich, king Otto expressed 
great satisfaction with I. Kolettis and his achievements.50 The royal support secured 
his unchallenged government in power, whose main desire was to stay in power.51 
On the other hand, Kolettis was a strong and persistent person. His faction occupied 
only 22 of the 127 members in the House of Commons.52 Through lavish use of gifts, 
bribes and intimidation, he managed the new Greek Parliament. His government op-
posed Mavrocordatos’ party majority in the Senate. In order to strengthen his position 
in the Parliament, he advised the King to appoint 15 new senators to get majority in 
the Senate. Kolettis succeeded in utilizing King Otto’s authority in order to enhance 
his influence in the Parliament. Gallant wrote that I. Kolettis was able to form working 
alliances with both the western modernizers and the traditional power brokers, while 
becoming closely tied to neither.53 
Kolettis avoided putting forward serious changes in the economic and social 
fields so as not to harm vested interests, and at the same time he rotated government 
positions to trusted friends and would–be friends, offering them promises of favors.54 
His foes had not been excluded from his way of governing in Greece. Patronage be-
came a main mechanism for Kolettis to remain in power.55 As Minister of Educational 
and religious Affairs, he offered employment to certain unemployed heterochtons 
at the newly-founded University of Athens.56 His government introduced control 
over the employment at the University. The nomination and replacement of profes-
sors were within the prerogatives of the Ministry of Education. Kolettis used this ar-
bitrary power, dismissing seven professors with a ministerial decree, and replaced 
them with others, friendly to the government.57 Here we would like to underline that 
the founder of modern Greek historiography, Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, a non–
native Greek by origin, was dismissed from his office after the promulgation of the 
Constitution in 1844. Paparrigopoulos firmly supported Kolettis’s policy. Earning his 
trust, Paparrigopoulos found a job as a professor of History in the secondary school 
49 Ibidem, p. 14. 
50 Ibidem, p. 16. 
51 Ibidem. 
52 T. W. Gallant, Modern Greece, London 2001, p. 41. 
53 Ibidem. 
54 J. S. Koliopoulos, T. Veremis, Modern Greece. A History since 1821, Chichester 2009, p. 37. 
55 a. Batalas, Send a thief to catch a thief. State building and the employment of irregular military 
formations in mid-nineteenth century Greece, in: Irregular armed forces and their role in politics and state 
formation, eds. D. E. Davis, A. W. Pereira, Cambridge 2003, p. 165. 
56 S. Petmezas, From privileged outcast to power players: the “Romantic” redefinition of the Hellenic 
nation in the mid-nineteenth century, in: The Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, romanticism and 
the uses of the past (1797–1896), eds. r. Beaton, D. ricks, Ashgate 2009 , p. 125. 
57 Ibidem. 
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of Athens in 1846.58 The Greek historian never forgot Kolettis’s help. In the foreword 
of the second volume of his History of the Greek Nation, Paparrigopoulos referred to 
the role of Kolettis on the appearance of the Great Idea.59 
Greece, like all the other Balkan states in the past, as well as today, is famous 
for its clientelistic politics. Many people visited Kolettis’s house, and they all left it 
with certain promises.60 Furthermore, Kolettis was notorious for receiving bribery – 
rüşvet (ρουσφετη), a household tradition in the region. Georgios Filaretos calls him 
the founder of the rüşvet school.61 In all likelihood, it was the easiest way to rule with-
out major turbulence.
By the end of 1845, Kolettis moved toward creating a new territorial administra-
tive division of the Greek state. With a governmental decree, the only independent 
Christian state in the Balkans was divided into 10 counties and 49 districts.62 Being 
an experienced politician, Kolettis probably deemed the new territorial division of 
Greece as a shortcut to implementing his intentions.
Kolettis was a member of the Archaeological Society in Athens, and its pres-
ident from 1844 up to his death in 1847.63 However, during his presidency in the 
Society, he had not shown particular interest in improving its activities. The Society 
began to decline, and the number of its subscribers to diminish.64 on the other hand, 
Kolletis paved the way for the opening of foreign cultural and educational institu-
tions in modern Greece. In 1846 the French School was founded in Athens (Ecole 
Francaise d’Athenes). It was the first foreign cultural institution in the country. The 
founding of this institution came as a result of the cooperation between Kolettis and 
the French ambassador in Athens, Piscatory.65 
Panhellenic propaganda flourished during Kolettis’ rule (1844/47). In schools, as 
well as in the University of Athens, the Greek youth was taught about the “inseparable 
link” between Ancient Greece, Byzantium, and modern Greece. The hitherto neglected 
Byzantine studies found their way into the Athens University classrooms,66 while, at 
the same time, Byzantium was looked upon as a stark contrast to the arch enemy – the 
Ottoman Empire. In the name of education, the Greek statesmen called the more emi-
58 m. Karasarinis, Spectres of the past: a comparative study of the role of historiography and cultur-
al memory in the development of nationalism in modern Scotland and Greece, PhD thesis, Univeristy of 
Glasgow 2001, p. 52. 
59 E. Skopetea, “Uzor – kraljevina’ I velika ideja, Beograd 2005, p. 196–197. 
60 Γ. Γ. Μπενέκου, Κωλέτης…, p. 271–272. 
61 Ibidem, p. 276. 
62 Εφημερις της κυβερνησεως, αρ. 32, p. 36–38
63 Π. Καββαδία, Ιστορία της Αρχαιολογικής Εταιρείας: από της εν έτει 1837 ιδρύσεως αυτής μέχρι του 
1900, Αθήνα 1900, p. 6. 
64 t. reinach, Greece rediscovered by the Greeks, in: Greece in evolution, ed. G.F. Abott, New York 
1910, p. 281. 
65 t. n. Bohotis, Archaeology and politics. The Greek-German Olympia excavations treaty, 1869–
1875, in: Ancient monuments and modern identities. A critical history of Archaeology in 19th and 20 th cen-
tury Greece, eds. S. Voutsaki, P. Cartledge, routledge, London and New York 2017, p. 127. 
66 G. Arnakis, Byzantium and Greece, „Balkan Studies” 1963, vol. V, no 4/2, p. 386–388. 
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nent representatives of the Ottoman Greek intelligentsia to come to Athens and assist 
in the preparation of better educational programs, as well as to teach at the University 
of Athens. Therefore, Alexandros Mavrocordatos convinced G.G. Papadopoulos, 
a teacher from Thessaloniki, to put together an elaborate project for an educational 
institution designed for the children of Christians outside Greece.67 In 1845 Kolettis 
sent a letter to Andreas Moustoxydis, a historian and philologist from Corfu, inviting 
him to teach at the University of Athens. This call sent the right message about the ac-
tivities of the Greek educational institutions. The Athenian press published the letter. 
Once more, Kolettis highlighted his opinion that Greece was called upon to enlighten 
the East by spreading education to the needy, hence prepare political unification with 
assistance from the University of Athens.68 Indeed, the appeal sent to the ottoman cit-
izens to come to Athens and help in the educational process opened the door for Greek 
education in the Ottoman Empire as a means of spreading the Greek influence. 
The issue of the Greek independent church was dominant in some of the dis-
cussions in the Greek Parliament. In December 1843, the Holy Synod of the Greek 
Church drew up a plan for an ecclesiastical statutory law in which it was stipulated 
that the Church of Greece was inseparably related to the Constantinople Patriarchate, 
while remaining independent at the level of self–governance.69 It is important to men-
tion here that the King was referred as protector and defender of the church, but not as 
head, as he had been denoted in the Organic Law of 1833. As Prime Minister, Kolettis 
formed a commission to study the problems of the Greek Orthodox Church, with the 
task to make recommendations to the government. Once these recommendations were 
received, Kolettis submitted legislation to the national assembly symbolizing some 
minor changes in the Church constitution of 1833.70 Stamatopoulos, writing about 
these problems, noted that Kolettis did not implement the lines indicated by Article 2 
of the Greek constitution at the legislative level.71 Taking into account that Kolettis, 
himself, was a signatory of the declaration for the independence of the Greek Church 
in 1833, his behavior on the Church question was not surprising.  
the Megali (Great) Idea became an official doctrine throughout Kolettis’s rule, as 
roumen Daskalov emphasized, although the Greek Prime Minister worked to consol-
idate the monarchy in Greece, and the position of King Otto.72 
The Ottoman authorities deeply mistrusted Kolettis as a Greek Prime Minister, 
and a politician as well. relations between the two countries continued to be strained, 
67 Н. Данова, Националният въпрос в гръцките политически програми през XIX век, София 
1980, p. 159. 
68 Ibidem, p. 160. 
69 D. Stamatopoulos, The Orthodox church of Greece, in: Orthodox Christianity and nationalism in 
nineteenth century Southeastern Europe, ed. L. N. Leustean, Fordham 2014, p. 43. 
70 C. Frazee, Church and state in Greece, in: Greece in Transition, ed. J. A. Koumoulides, London 
1977, p. 135. 
71 D. Stamatopoulos, The Orthodox church of Greece…, p. 44. 
72 r. Daskalov, Bulgarian-Greek dis/entanglements, in: Entangled Histories in the Balkans, eds. r. 
Daskalov, T. Marinov, Leiden-Boston 2013, vol. 1, p. 201. 
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throughout his governing with Greece, despite Kolettis’s attempts to show that he 
was still pursuing moderate policies.73 Kolettis was quite aware of the concerns of 
the French and the British ambassadors in Athens regarding the relations Greece had 
with the Ottoman Empire. In his conversation with Piscatory, Kolettis underlined that 
it was his obligation to dissipate such apprehensions. However, he did not conceal his 
opinion about the future Greek territorial expansion at the expense of the Ottoman 
Empire. Despite defining himself as a partisan of the status quo, and an opponent to 
any invasion and armed propaganda against the northern neighbor, the Greek Prime 
Minister remarked that the time would come when the force of events alone will do 
what we could not do now without a general overthrow, which would perhaps entire-
ly sweep away the Kingdom of Greece.74 In order to follow the activities of various 
conspiratorial associations, the Ottomans intensified the activities of their intelligence 
service all over Greece. The prudence of the Ottoman authorities was well-ground-
ed, because several immigrant groups from various Ottoman-ruled Balkan territories 
were operating in Athens at that time.75 Indisputably, the activities of these groups 
caught the Ottoman‘s attention. radu, the Ottoman representative in Athens, was 
aware of three conspiracies, the first of which was organized by the numerous cap-
tains from Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia. radu mentions the names of 53 captains 
who could potentially endanger Ottoman interests.76 These chieftains intended to pen-
etrate into the Ottoman border areas, but radu, with bribes and monthly wages, suc-
cessfully managed to convince them to stay put. Furthermore, the Ottoman represent-
ative managed to plant his own informers among the conspirators, and he was well 
aware of every move made by the captains. The mastermind of the second plot was 
Ioannis Kolettis, whose collaborators included the Minister of War, Kitsos Tzavelas, 
Mansolas, General Mamouris, and others.77 The conspirators set themselves up unat-
tainable goals, given the political and the economic strength of the Greek kingdom. 
The main idea behind the plot was to provoke riots in Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia, 
mayhem in Constantinople, followed by an occupation of the said regions. The plan 
also foresaw the possibility of winning over the Slavic populations from the Balkans, 
in order to jointly fight the Ottomans and to speed up the process of conquering the 
lands claimed by Greece. The third plot was prepared by the Balkan Slavs in Athens, 
centered around the Thrace-Bulgarian-Serbian Society, or the Macedonian Society.78 
73 His attempts to pursue moderate policies in the relations with the Ottoman Empire were perhaps 
a result of the continuous warnings arriving from Paris that France will not sacrifice itself for Greece (С. 
Дамянов, Френската политика на Балканите 1829–1853, София 1977, p. 190–191). 
74 M. Guizot, France under Louis-Philippe…, p. 299. 
75 V. Stojančević, Problemi saradnje balkanskih naroda I nacionalnooslobodilačkim pokretima 
u Turskoj u prvoj polovini XIX veka, „Jugoslovenski Istorijski Časopis” 1969, no. 4, p. 60. 
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None of the three conspiracies yielded positive results due to the lack of basic condi-
tions for their fulfillment. However, the Ottoman authorities in the border areas took 
precautionary measures in order to protect their territorial integrity. Thus, based on the 
collected intelligence data, the Ottomans sent fresh troops to the garrison in Larissa, 
intending to fight off any Greek attempt to enter Ottoman territory.79
The activities of the secret organizations and the brigands were not without rea-
son. One of the elements which would threaten Kolettis‘s government were the cap-
tains and their armed retainers. He allowed them free reign in the frontier zone with 
the ottoman empire in which they exercised their talents and, no less useful for the 
stability of his regime, they were used to project such forays into the irredenta as 
proof of the government’s devotion to the vision of liberating the unredeemed breth-
ren across the frontier.80 Kolettis succeeded in directing brigand activities towards the 
Ottoman Empire by harnessing brigandage more effectively than hitherto to irredent-
ism.81 According to Koliopoulos, in this way the Greek Prime Minister satisfied a po-
tentially dangerous social element without burdening state finances, while creating the 
impression that Greek national aspirations were not being abandoned.82 But there was 
another reason for tolerating the brigand’s activities by Kolettis’s government. The 
brigands and the irregulars were used as tools for political intimidation.83
As a result of the incessant activities of the brigands along the border and on 
Ottoman territory, Greek–Ottoman relations were permanently strained. It was a ques-
tion of time when the relations between Athens and Constantinople would provoke 
a crisis endangering regional stability and peace. In January 1847, Dimitrios Tzamis 
Caratassos, a high officer in the Greek army and a participant in the Greek revolution, 
applied for an Ottoman visa, intending to visit Constantinople (Istanbul). His appli-
cation for an Ottoman visa produced a great crisis in the relations between the two 
neighboring countries. The Ottoman ambassador in Athens refused to issue a visa 
for Caratassos. His refusal was not without grounds. In 1841 Caratassos had joined 
a band of rebels and robbers who had plundered and caused problems in Thessaly. The 
Ottoman military forces destroyed his band, inducing Caratassos to escape in Greece. 
Later, he became a very close friend and supporter of Kolettis, who helped him attain 
high military rank and be appointed as one of King’s Otto aides–de camp. regardless 
of his high position in Greek society, the Ottoman government did not forget his past 
activities. 
The Ottoman refusal to grant Caratassos a visa caused a serious diplomatic cri-
sis between Greece and the Ottoman Empire. Caratassos informed Kolettis about his 
79 Британски документи за историјата на македонскиот народ, Скопје 1977, vol. 2, p. 189 
(Blunt to Stratford Canning, Thessaloniki, 28.03.1845). 
80 J. S. Koliopoulos, T. Veremis, Modern Greece. A History since 1821..., p. 37. 
81 a. Batalas, Send a thief to catch a thief..., p. 166. 
82 J. S. Koliopoulos, Brigand with a cause. Brigandage and irredentism in Modern Greece (1821–
1913), Oxford 1987, p. 11. 
83 Ibidem, p. 165. 
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meeting with Komenou bey, secretary in the Ottoman Embassy in Athens.84 this was 
a great opportunity for Kolettis to publicly show his apprehension about the rights 
of Greek citizens violated by Ottoman behavior. He informed King Otto about the 
Caratassos affair. The King‘s reaction to this affair was more than furious and reck-
less. During the court ball, which was held a few days later, the Greek King ap-
proached the Ottoman ambassador and spoke to him in a loud tone, which was very 
offensive for the Ottoman diplomat who demonstratively left the royal palace. The 
following day Musouros went to the Greek government. He demanded an explanation 
from Kolettis about the King’s words. The Ottoman government insisted that King 
Otto should issue Mousouros a public apology.85 Kolettis rejected the Ottoman de-
mands. As a result of the Greek rejection, the Porte decided to withdraw its diplomat-
ic representative from Athens.
The crisis between Athens and Constantinople caused a great deal of concern 
among the Great Powers, although they were divided in their support to the parties 
involved in this dispute. Thus, France sided with the Greek position, whilst Great 
Britain demonstrated sympathy and support to the Ottoman government. The ambas-
sadors attempted to ease the relations between Greece and the Ottoman Empire in or-
der to avoid further deterioration of the tense situation. King Otto also made an effort 
to prevent a further decline in the relations of his country with its mighty neighbor. He 
sent a personal letter to the Sultan, where he expressed his desire to settle the dispute. 
The Sultan gave a very evasive answer to this letter. Simultaneously, the Ottoman 
Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a letter to the representatives of the Great Powers in 
Athens with a demand, as a precondition to Mousouros’s reappearance at his post, that 
Kolettis should pay him a visit and express his regret concerning the unpleasant affair. 
In case of refusal, the Ottoman government would break all diplomatic relations with 
greece.86 The Ottoman demand was completely unacceptable for Kolettis. He knew 
very well that his regret to the Ottoman ambassador in Athens would diminish his po-
sition in Greece. Thus, Kolettis rejected the Ottoman proposal. His refusal to go to 
the Ottoman Embassy and to apologize to Mouosuros provoked an immediate break 
in diplomatic relations between Greece and the Ottoman Empire.87 Furthermore, the 
Ottoman government resolved to limit the rights of the Greek subjects and to exclude 
them from trade guilds. The Ottoman ports were closed for Greek vessels, as well. 
Such Ottoman measures, without a doubt, severely harmed the Greek economic in-
terests. 
The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Metternich, decided to become an ar-
biter in the Greek–Ottoman dispute. He suggested that Kolettis write a letter in which 
he would express his regret concerning the origin of the dispute.88 the french diplo-
84 J. V. Kofas, International and domestic politics in Greece..., p. 28. 
85 Е. Michelsen, Ottoman Empire and its resources, London 1853, p. 105. 
86 Ibidem, p. 107–108. 
87 J. V. Kofas, International and domestic politics in Greece..., p. 30. 
88 e. michelsen, Ottoman Empire and its resources..., p. 110. 
236 DALIBOr JOVANOVSKI, NIKOLA MINOV
macy, astounded by the ferocity of the Mousouros affair, and, above all, of the dy-
namic of British involvement against the Greek Prime Minister, decided to make the 
whole tense situation less perilous. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Guizot, 
despite his unwillingness to sacrifice French interests in Greece, suggested to Athens 
that Kolettis should resign from his post, at least temporarily.89 Guizot’s advice to 
Kolettis was not accepted by the Greek Prime Minister. He was aware that his refus-
al to step down from the post would not meet any French reprisals. On the other hand, 
the Greek Prime Minister was aware of the consequences from the Ottoman measures 
against the Greek subjects and their economic interests. He saw the danger of his gov-
ernment becoming unpopular in the country. Therefore, he urged the King to attempt 
to accept more reconciliatory behavior with the Ottomans.90 The relations between the 
two countries started to improve, but he did not see the arrival of the Ottoman ambas-
sador in Athens due to his death.
As a leader of the pro-French political group in Greece, Kolettis manifested pro-
found mistrust of Great Britain and its representative in Athens. He believed that Great 
Britain wished to organize his country as an English Greece, governed by an English 
ambassador.91 Taking into account his political orientation towards France, the behav-
ior of the British diplomacy on the Greek internal and external position was expected. 
The British Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston, described Kolettis as the new Ali Pasha, 
i.e. a troublemaker in the region.92
The British diplomacy, once it had determined that the Greek government was 
antagonistic to its interests in the region, invented all the possible ways to embar-
rass Kolettis and to topple him from the Prime Ministerial post.93 One of the ways 
by which Great Britain asserted pressure to Greece was with a demand on the Greek 
government to pay the interest on the loan of 1832.94 Kolettis had inherited an emp-
ty treasury, and an obligation to pay 6,3 million drachma to the Protecting Powers. 
But, Kolettis refused to fulfill the Greek obligation. The British politicians were fu-
rious, and criticized Greece for not making its payments.95 the British critics were 
not directed to the Greek state which was financially unable to realize its obligations. 
The target of the British critics was Kolettis himself, because of his profound con-
nections with France. The British government started to denunciate Kolettis for cor-
ruption and dictatorial rule in Greece. Palmerston, in his letter to Prince Albert, re-
vealed that the British government had nothing against the Greek people, but only 
89 J. T. Malakasis, The diplomatic position of Kolettis vis a vis France and England. A brief analy-
sis of the factors involved in the foreign policy of the first Greek constitutional ministry, „Δωδωνη” 1975, 
no 4, p. 402. 
90 G. Finlay, A History of Greece…, p. 202. 
91 M. Guizot, France under Louis-Philippe…, p. 300. 
92 Д. Јовановски, Грчката балканска политика и Македонија 1830–1881, Скопје 2005, p. 33. 
93 J. T. Malakasis, The diplomatic position of Kolettis vis a vis France and England…, p. 402. 
94 J. V. Kofas, International and domestic politics in Greece…, p. 34.
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against Kolettis.96 All the endeavors of Palmerston to topple Kolettis and his govern-
ment were fruitless.
The strained relations with the Ottomans produced serious economic implications 
on Greek trade. It was a chance for Kolettis’s political opponents to build up their po-
sition in Greece. But, Kolettis was far from being politically naïve. He used the influ-
ence of King Otto to cope with the mounting opposition. The King and Kolettis dis-
missed the Parliament and called for new elections. The Greek Prime Minister used 
all possible means, legal and illegal, which he disposed to gain great political victory 
in order to control the Parliament. In the 1847 elections, Kolettis won a major victo-
ry, winning 5/6 of the votes. The opposition was humiliated. However, there was ev-
idence that the elections in the non-urban areas had been accompanied by violence 
and falsification of the voters’ will.97 Despite this tremendous electoral result, Kolettis 
did not get the chance to reap the benefits of his victory. As a consequence of his long 
struggle with cancer, he died on 31 August 1847. 
SUMMArY:
The Vlach people, despite being a stateless ethnic minority in southeastern Europe, have traditionally 
been deeply involved in every part of the social life in the countries they inhabited. In Greece, more than in 
any other country, the influence of certain prominent Vlachs has been felt since the foundation of the mod-
ern Greek state. Ioannis Kolettis, who served as Prime Minister of Greece from 1844 to 1847, is a strik-
ing example of the above thesis. Kolettis left a lasting impression on Greek internal and foreign affairs. 
Despite his non-Greek but Vlach origins, Kolettis is credited for conceiving the Great Idea, which became 
the core of Greek foreign policy and dominated Greek domestic politics for over half a century.
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